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COURT 
N T 
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NATURE OF 
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THE 
F 
PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal by Applicant-Appellant Norman J. Mayhew is 
from an Order of the Industrial Commission, State of Utah, 
dated March 7, 1989. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-86 and 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This appeal by Applicant-Appellant Norman J. Mayhew is 
from an Order of the Industrial Commission denying workers 
compensation benefits to Norman J. Mayhew, a worker who 
suffered from pre-existing headaches, for recurring head-
aches induced by an incident arising out of his employment. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues involve the application of the Allen v. 
Industrial Commissiony 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah, 1986) case in 
which the Supreme Court set forth two pre-requisites for a 
finding of a compensable industrial injury (accident and 
causation) by establishing a two part test, requiring proof 
of legal and medical causation, for determining the ultimate 
element of. causation. The issues are: (1) whether there is 
evidence to support the finding of the Industrial Commission 
that the incident involving Mr. Mayhew on March 12, 1987 
occasioned any stress or exertion greater than that under-
taken in normal everyday life, applying an objective stan-
dard to compare usual and unusual stress or exertion; and 
whether the record is sufficient to show a lack of a medical-
ly demonstrable link between the incident of March 12, 1987 
and the resulting injury. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, and cases inter-
preting the section are determinative of the issues raised. 
Section 35-1-45 is set forth verbatim in the addendum 
hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action 
This case involves the denial of workers compen-
sation benefits to Norman J. Mayhew based upon a headache 
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developed while engaged in a discussion of a personnel 
appraisal review form which headache and pre-existing 
conditions resulted in permanent and total disability to Mr. 
Mayhew. Mr. Mayhew has a history of headaches and other 
emotional problems dating back more than 18 months prior to 
the incident of March 12, 1987. The dispute before the 
Court of Appeals is whether there is insufficient proof of 
either legal causation or medical causation as found by the 
administrative law judge and affirmed by the Industrial 
Commission to support an award of workers compensation. 
B. Course of Proceedings - Disposition Below 
On June 2, 1987, Mr. Mayhew filed an Application 
for Hearing alleging "Harassment by Gordon Shrock, J. 0. 
Mack & Dave Brown caused extreme head pain, clinic ice pack-
ing, transportation to Ogden Clinic." (R9). Respondent 
answered denying any liability (R13). Mr. Mayhew then filed 
a ten page clarification letter attempting to explain the 
claim (R14). On July 12, 1988, another Application for Hear-
ing was filed prepared by counsel Gale Lemmon to which Defen-
dants again denied liability (R31). 
Following the hearing of October 14, 1988, the 
Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order denying Mr. Mayhew1s claim for 
workers compensation benefits (R316). The order issued 
October 21, 1988. Mr. Lemmon was discharged as counsel by 
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Mr, Mayhew on November 8f 1988. On November 21, 1988 Mr. 
Mayhew filed a "Motion to Review Findings of Fact, Produc-
tion of Documents, Supporting Evidence and New Evidence Not 
Introduced in the Hearing." Mr. Mayhew included 106 pages 
of attachments and exhibits (R336-442) . Respondent did not 
receive any portion of the above Motion either from Mr. 
Mayhew or the Industrial Commission. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah unanimously issued 
its Order Denying Motion for Review on the 7th day of March, 
1989 (R443). 
Mr. Mayhew, pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Review 
directed to the Respondent who is listed as the Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah. This agency -
Department of Employment Security - is a separate and dis-
tinct agency of the Industrial Commission wholly unrelated 
to the Workers Compensation Division (R447). Respondent did 
not receive a copy of this motion or the attachments. Mr. 
Mayhew filed a Docketing Statement on May 3f 1989 consisting 
of 71 pages (R462-533). Respondent did not receive a copy 
of the Docketing Statement. A Motion to Reverse Lower Court 
Decision was filed May 3, 1989 (R530). A Court of Appeals 
Order issued waiving the filing fee (R535). Respondent did 
not receive either the Motion or the Order. Respondent 
first became aware of this appeal on approximately May 20, 
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1989 when contacted by the court reporter inquiring about 
the purchase of a transcript. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
The Appellant was hired by Respondent originally 
in 1966, was terminated in 1976, rehired in 1981 and was 
never terminated by Respondent (R40). Appellant was a 
quality control engineer on the date of the incident and had 
been for over three years (R42). 
Appellant's workers compensation claim had its 
origin in a meeting called at the request of management to 
discuss his personnal appraisal review form with his super-
visors (R43, 44f 128-134, 148-151). The meeting was called 
by Mr. Schrock for March 12, 1987 and 1:30 p.m. (R148) . 
Appellant, Mr. Brown, Mr. Schrock and Mr. Mack were present. 
The latter were supervisors or administrators of the 
employer (R128 et seq.). In the evaluation, the appellant 
was informed that he would need improvement in the area of 
communicating the technical information required as part of 
his job and that his overall rating was competent (R132). 
Appellant took exception to the evaluation. In the course 
of discussion, Brown relates "It seemed like he was just 
starting to get his point across when he kind of tossed his 
arms up in the air and said 'what's the use1 and walked out 
the door (R129). Mr. Mayhew's version of the event varies 
considerably but only in detail (R43-45). Appellant 
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characterized the meeting as a refusal to discuss the eval-
uation and testified ". • . and everything that I requested 
was refused and they refused any comment, refused to change 
anything, refused to give any essay on anything. It was 
just complete refusal. As this went on, I suffered a very 
severe — it's the type of headache like a nerve in the 
tooth or eating ice cream too fast. And it was a pain that 
brought tears to my eyes." (R45,46). Mr. Brown character-
ized the meeting as somewhat more difficult that others 
because Mr. Mayhew was not satisfied by the performance 
appraisal (R133). Mr. Schrock characterized the meeting as 
"just not finished" and "somewhat difficult." (R155). 
Mr. Mayhew had an accident involving a head injury in 
September, 1985 (R109, 239) resulting in treatment for head-
aches. In January, 1986, Mr. Mayhew was treated for "recur-
ring headaches" (R109,239), pain mediation in April, 1986 
(R239), November 17, 1986 "severe headaches" requiring ice 
packs. Mr. Mayhew has been diagnosed as having cervical 
neck disease in April 1988 (R246), degenerative joint 
disease of cervical spine in April 1987 (R247), occipital 
headaches, severe headaches April 3, 1987 (R252), recent 
headache January 10, 1986 (R255), cervical neck strain 
September 11, 1985 (R256). July, 1988 chronic cervical pain 
secondary to degenerative joint disease which is mild 
(R266). 
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Mr. Mayhew has been unable to work since March 13, 
1987. (R9) 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ hereafter) summarized 
in general the factual background prior to the incident of 
March 12, 1987 indicating that the onset of "stress 
headaches" began as early as his transfer to Clearfield from 
the Bacchus Works. Scattered through the testimony was 
perceived or imagined instances of employer harassment 
and/or discrimination. Mr. Mayhew testified that he was a 
crusader for what was right and that the muscles in the back 
of his neck will tighten up with stress. (R28,49). 
Both the ALJ and Respondent's counsel made it very 
clear to Mr. Mayhew and his then counsel that the claim was 
based upon a specific event - namely the meeting of March 
12, 1987 - and not an occupational disease claim based upon 
a theory of continued instances of purported stress 
eventually resulting in the meeting of March 12, 1987 and 
the supposed breakdown. 
The ALJ allowed Mr. Mayhew and his counsel wide 
latitude on his employment background but made it cl-ear to 
all that we were concerned with the March 12, 1987 
occurrence. No claim was ever made that this was an 
occupational disease under the Utah Occupational Disease 
Disability Act, Section 35-2-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). 
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The ALJ found specifically: 
"Since the applicant is contending that he has 
sustained a compensable industrial accident on or 
about March 12, 1987, it is necessary to apply 
the test of an industrial accident set forth by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Allen v. 
Industrial Commission 729 P. 2d (Utah 1986), 
Allen requires that the injury occurred "by 
accident" and that there is a causal connection 
between the alleged accident and the activities 
or exertions required in the workplace. The 
first test which must be satisfied is the legal 
causation test. That test for those with 
pre-existing conditions requires that the employ-
ment must contribute something substantial to 
increase the risk the Applicant already encoun-
tered in everyday life because of his condition." 
Previously recited is a history of headaches and 
emotional problems dating back as far as two years prior to 
the incident of March 12, 1987. The record also discloses 
numerous diagnoses of "headaches," "cervical disc- disease," 
"non industrial whip lash type" injuries. Because of the 
extensive history of headache problems the administrative 
law judge held the applicant to the higher standard of the 
Allen decision (supra). This requires the applicant to 
show something unusual or extraordinary about the incident 
of March 12, 1987. 
The ALJ in addressing this point found: 
"I have gleaned no evidence of any unusual 
activity or exertion which may have occurred in 
that meeting. The record is devoid of any 
evidence that the meeting of March 12, 1987 was 
the stressful event that the Applicant would have 
the Administrative Law Judge believe." (R320) 
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The ALJ after a review of all the records
 f results of 
the hearing including a Social Security disability benefits 
award the following was found: 
"After reviewing the findings of the Social 
Security Administration and the other medical 
reports on file, it would appear to the Adminis-
trative Law Judge that much of the activity at 
Hercules, which the applicant was concerned 
about, was of no significance. In light of the 
applicant's medical problems, it can be explained 
as the product of a paranoid personality which 
Dr. Abdullah has found that the applicant suffers 
from. Once that diagnosis is brought to the 
fore, the conspiracy theories and other theories 
propounded by the applicant make some semblance 
of sense. However, the medical evidence does 
not show any causal connection between the 
applicant's meeting of March 12, 1987 and the 
severe headache he started complaining of. 
(R320) (Underscoring added.) 
The Industrial Commission upon review of the total 
claim - which included numerous documents of what was in the 
record as well as many documents not of record but reviewed 
by the Commission to give applicant all possible benefit of 
all available claims concluded: 
"The Commission finds that the only issue on 
review is whether the Administrative Law Judge 
correctly denied benefits in this case. The 
Commission adopts the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact as stated in the October 21, 
1988 Order. The Commission agrees with the 
Administrative Law Judge that medical and legal 
causation have not been established. With 
respect to medical cause, the medical records 
submitted, in general, do not specify a medical 
opinion regarding what was causing the headaches. 
Most of the reports or records just state what 
the applicant felt was causing the headaches. At 
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least one doctor did specify some concerns with 
respect to functional overlay. Therefore, a 
causal connection between the work problems is 
not clearly established by the medical records. 
With respect to legal causation, the Commission 
agrees with the Administrative Law Judge that the 
higher unusual exertion requirement is applicable 
due to the applicant's history of headaches prior 
to the 1987 work conflict. Although it is diffi-
cult to discern what mental stress the 20th cen-
tury individual must face in everyday non-employ-
ment Life, the Commission finds that the stress 
caused by disagreement with a superior's perfor-
mance review cannot be considered unusual in 
intensity when compared with everyday family, 
financial or other non-employment stresses. 
Because the Commission finds that neither legal 
nor medical cause are established, the Commission 
must affirm the Administrative Law Judge and deny 
the Motion for Review. (R444) (Underscoring 
added) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. THIS COURT HAS A LIMITED SCOPE OF REVIEW AND 
MUST SURVEY THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
The gravamen of this case narrows down to the 
following issue: Was there substantial evidence to support 
the decision of the Industrial Commission's denying workers 
compensation benefits to Mr. Mayhew? 
This standards for review by the Court of Appeals 
is limited to a "correction of error" standard and need not 
rely upon the expertise of the Industrial Commission in the 
interpretation and application of statutes and legislative 
enactments. The Industrial Commission's action in this case 
were neither arbitrary or capricious but were based upon a 
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total review of the record disclosing a total lack of 
evidence to support an award. 
II. WHETHER THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FIND-
INGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THAT THE INCIDENT OF MARCH 
12, 1987 WAS NOT CAUSALLY RELATED - BOTH LEGAL AND MEDICAL -
TO THE HEADACHES AND RESULTANT TOTAL DISABILITY. 
The argument in Point II is that the Industrial 
Commission in applying the decision in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission (supra) found that Mr. Mayhew failed to produce 
any evidence of (1) legal causation and (2) medical causa-
tion as a result of the incident of March 12, 1987. 
(1) Because Mr. Mayhew had previous problems with 
headaches and emotional concernsf he was required to show 
that the stress or exertion involved in his accident 
exceeded the exertion or stress that the average person 
typically undertakes in non-employment life. While Mr. 
Mayhew characterized the stressful nature of the meeting his 
testimony which was corroborated by the employers 
representatives present did not appear to be so. 
(2) The medical causation connection between the 
meeting of March 12, 1987 was only supported by what Mr. 
Mayhew told his doctors and not by an independent evaluation 
or suggestion that a direct medical relationship did exist. 
III. THE ADEQUACY OF MR. MAYHEW1S BRIEF, FAILURE TO SUPPLY 
TIMELY COPIES OF ALL PLEADINGS AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO 
BOTH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE 
IRREGULAR AND IMPROPER DESIGNATION OF PARTIES. 
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As spelled out in the section dealing with the "Course 
of Proceedings - Disposition Below", Respondent has care-
fully enumerated the failures and inadequacies of notice and 
appraisal of what was occurring in this matter. All the 
shortcomings occurred after the discharge by Mr, Mayhew of a 
very able and skilled workers compensation attorney, Mr. 
Gale Lemmon. I am informed and therefore believe that the 
discharge occurred because Mr. Lemmon felt an appeal was 
inappropriate and refused to appeal. All time periods were 
met by Mr. Mayhew but no opportunity given to Respondents to 
answer on any portion of the appeal process until May, 1989. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS A 
LIMITED SCOPE OF REVIEW AND MUST 
SURVEY THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS AND ORDER 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
The scope of appellate review in Industrial Commission 
matters has been described and interpreted many times by the 
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The most recent 
decision on this subject is the very recent case of Olympus 
Oil Inc., the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund v. Stanley Lou Harrison, and the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 26. The 
Court of Appeals said in part: 
At the outset, we note that issues 
involving the interpretation of legislative acts 
and the statutory boundaries of the Commission's 
power and authority involve questions of law. 
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Utah Dept. of Admin. Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 68 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah, 1983). 
Resolution of the issues in this case is not 
benefitted by the Commission's expertise or 
experience. See, e.g., Bennett v. Industrial 
Commission 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). The 
Commission has no expertise or experience in 
determining whether the worker is an "employee" 
within the meaning of the workers compensation 
law. We thus apply a correction-of-error 
standard with no deference given to the expertise 
of the Commission. State Tax Commission v. 
Industrial Commission 685 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah 
1984). (This standard applied in lieu of 
standard set forth in the UAPA, Utah Code 
Annotated Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)(1988)). 
In Richard Barry Hurley et. al., v. Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment 
Security, Utah Adv. Report 20 (Utah 12/12/1988) the Supreme 
Court in reviewing this self same issue stated in part: 
"The correction-of-error standard of 
judicial review applies to agency decisions 
involving statutory interpretations which an 
appellate court is as well suited to decide as 
the agency. In Bennett v.. Industrial 
Commission 726 P.2d 427,429 (Utah 1986) the 
Court stated: 
We do not defer to the Commission 
when construing statutory terms or 
when applying statutory terms to 
the facts unless the construction 
of the statutory language or the 
application of the law to the facts 
should be subject to the 
Commission's expertise gleaned from 
its accumulated practical, first 
hand experience with the subject 
matter. 
The correction-of-error standard also applies 
when the issue is one of basic legislative 
intent. 
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Thus, that standard also governs the construction 
of ordinary statutory terms. See, e*g. 
Bennett, 726 P. 2d at 429 (coverage of workers 
compensation statute to subcontractors employee; 
Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 p, 2d 
779, 782 (Utah 1984) (applicable limitations 
period under workers compensation." ... 
It is also fundamental in Utah that the Court of 
Appeals will not review or weight the probative effect of 
conflicting evidence before the Commission. Wiseman v. 
Village Partners 589 P.2d 754, 755 (Utah 1978); dinger v. 
Industrial Commission 571 P.2d 1328, 1329 (Utah 1977). 
The Court of Appeals must also survey the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commission's findings. 
Chadwick v» Industrial Commission 57 2 P.2d 400, Duaine 
Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission, 29 Utah 2.d 
478 (1973) . 
As shown below, the Industrial Commission's findings 
and actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Such 
findings were based upon the totality of the evidence or the 
lack thereof, on behalf of Mr. Mayhew and should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
POINT II. WHETHER THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
THAT THE INCIDENT OF MARCH 12, 1987 WAS 
NOT CAUSALLY RELATED - BOTH (A) LEGAL AND 
(B) MEDICAL - TO THE HEADACHES AND 
RESULTANT TOTAL DISABILITY. 
(A) Legal Causation 
Section 35-1-45 of the Workers Compensation Act 
provides in part. 
"Every employee .. . who is injured ... by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his 
Thus, that standard also governs the construction 
of ordinary statutory terms. See, e.g. 
Bennett, 726 P. 2d at 429 (coverage of workers 
compensation statute to subcontractors employee; 
Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P. 2d 
779, 782 (Utah 1984) (applicable limitations 
period under workers compensation." ... 
It is also fundamental in Utah that the Court of 
Appeals will not review or weight the probative effect of 
conflicting evidence before the Commission. Wiseman v. 
Village Partners 589 P.2d 754, 755 (Utah 1978); dinger v. 
Industrial Commission 571 P.2d 1328, 1329 (Utah 1977). 
The Court of Appeals must also survey the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commission's findings. 
Chadwick v. Industrial Commission 572 P.2d 400, Duaine 
Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission. 
As shown below, the Industrial Commission's findings 
and actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Such 
findings were based upon the totality of the evidence or the 
lack thereof, on behalf of Mr. Mayhew and should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
POINT II. WHETHER THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
THAT THE INCIDENT OF MARCH 12, 1987 WAS 
NOT CAUSALLY RELATED - BOTH (A) LEGAL AND 
(B) MEDICAL - TO THE HEADACHES AND 
RESULTANT TOTAL DISABILITY. 
(A) Legal Causation 
Section 35-1-45 of the Workers Compensation Act 
provides in part. 
"Every employee ... who is injured ... by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his 
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employment ... shall be paid compensation for 
loss sustained on account of the injury •.•" 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d L5 (Utah 
1986) , the Supreme Court said of Section 35-1-45: 
This statute creates two prerequisites for a 
finding of a compensable injury. First, the 
injury must be "by accident." Second, the 
language "arising out of or in the court of 
employment" requires that there be a causal 
connection between the injury and the 
employment. 729 P.2d at 18 (emphasis added) 
The two prequisites are separate and distinct. The ALJ 
and the Commission did in fact treat them separately and 
made specific findings on each. 
Accident, under Allen, supra, is established when it 
is shown that an unintended, unexpected occurrence that may 
be either the cause or the result of an injury that took 
place. 729 P. 2d at 22. Given Mr. Mayhew's pre-existing 
condition and the fact that he had been treated for this 
self same condition over a period of several months would 
lead to the result which occurred on March 12, 1987 
regardless of any other circumstances. 
It is apparent that both the ALJ and the Commission 
found that the legal cause had not been met. The ALJ stated 
"After reviewing the findings of the Social Security 
Administrtion and the other medical reports on file, it 
would appear to the ALJ that much of the activity at 
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which the applicant was concerned about was of no 
significance ..." (R320) 
The Industrial Commission in keeping with the findings 
of the ALJ by determining: "With respect to legal causation, 
the Commission agrees with the ALJ that the higher unusual 
exertion requirement is applicable due to the applicant's 
history of headaches prior to the 1987 work conflict ... the 
Commission finds that the stress caused by disagreement 
with a superiors performance review cannot be considered 
unusual in intensity when compared with everyday family, 
financial or other non-employment stresses." (R444) 
(Underscoring added) 
The burden of proving legal causation was on the 
Appellant. In Allen (supra) the Court stated: 
"Since the claimant had previous back problems to 
meet the legal causation requirement he must 
show that [his exertion] exceeded the exertion 
that the average person typically undertakes in 
n on-employment life" 729 P. 2d at 28 
(Underscoring added) 
Appellant failed in this regard by limiting himself to 
the incident of March 12, 1987. The ALJ characterized that 
meeting by stating "The record is devoid of any evidence 
that the meeting of March 12, 1987 was the stressful event 
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the Applicant would have the ALJ believe." (R320) 
The only case found by Respondent involving a pure and 
unusual stress claim of one specific occurrence was United 
States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 P.2d 508 (Utah 1980). 
The facts involved a fellow employee rushing to the scene of 
a particularly horrifying industrial accident involving a 
fellow employee. The Supreme Court said: 
"The conduct of the employee running to investi-
gate and to offer help when it appeared that a 
fellow employee might be in critical danger or 
distress was a natural and reasonably expectable 
reaction so that his subsequent death from a 
heart attack was an accident arising out of his 
employment. The fact that the deceased had a 
pre-existing heart condition did not preclude 
finding that his death resulted from an accident 
in the course of his employment." 
This case, although decided six years before Allen, 
was in fact the precursor of that decision in holding that 
in the presence of pre-existing conditions a significant, 
highly stressful and not activity of a normal type could 
result in a compensable accident. 
In Workers Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission 
91 Utah Advanced Report 11, (Utah 1988) the Court of Appeals 
found compensability for a fatal heart attack that resulted 
from an extremely stressful work period. The facts concern 
a truck driver whose truck was 6-1/2 hours late to depart to 
Denver. The driver left without sleep the previous night, 
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drove through snow and slippery roads to Denver for 12 
hours. After five sleepless hours in Denver, on his return 
to Salt Lake within 30 minutes of Denverf driver went off 
the road and was found dead of heart failure. The driver 
had no history of heart disorder. This court said: 
"Given this determination, Steward's employment 
activity need only have involved usual or ordin-
ary exertion. See Price River Coal v. 
Industrial Commission , 731 P.2d at 1082 n.l; 
Allen, 729 P. 2d at 26. Steward's heart attack 
occurred while he was driving a truck for his 
employer, an exertion connected with his usual 
employment duty. Thus, the legal causation prong 
is satisfied. 
Furthermore, even if Steward did suffer 
pre-existing risk factors sufficient to invoke 
the higher "unusual or extraordinary exertion" 
threshold, as the Fund argues, we are convinced 
Steward satisfied standard." 
The ALJ found that Steward was subject to 
the following work related stress factors: 
(1) Anxiety caused by the late 
arrival of his truck delaying his 
departure from Salt Lake City, (2) 
fatigue from having to drive on 
slippery roads and during a snow 
storm, both to and from Denver, (3) 
fatigue from inadequate rest prior 
to his departure from Denver and 
(4) the use of amphetamines, prob-
ably in greater amounts than usual 
because of the lack of rest. 
Under the applicable standards of review, 
see Lancaster 739 P. 2d at 238, we find there is 
competent evidence before the Administrative Law 
Judge to support his finding that Steward's 
employment stress and exertion was both the legal 
and medical cause of his fatal heart attack. 
Contrast the foregoing cases of work related stress 
both resulting in death and both having stress factors far 
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in excess of what is found in normal family and employment 
life with the instant case. The only basis for a claim by 
Appellant was a meeting called to discuss routine personnel 
matters that purportedly caused a headache in the Appellant. 
It is respectfully submitted that the headache had no 
relationship to the meeting. 
B. Medical Causation 
The issue of medical causation becomes virtually 
moot since the Appellant has failed on the legal causation. 
A review of the record reveals a long history of headaches 
dating back over 1-1/2 years. Thus a pre-existing condition 
exists and Appellant is now held to the higher standard of 
"unusual or extraordinary" stress or strain. This is fully 
covered above. 
All of the medical reports are self serving in the 
sense that the doctor repeats what the Appellant has told* 
him regarding the source of his complaint. The Appellant 
and his wife are the only ones who refer his headaches to 
work related causes. 
Only the Appellant advised of the nature of the work as 
being stressful. The other witnesses simply do not corro-
borate the relationship of any job activity and the head-
aches suffered by the appellant. 
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One can only assume that the headaches simply developed 
on the job. However, no medical relationship has been esta-
blished that work activities produced the headache. 
It must be here remembered that Appellant has charged 
Respondent only with the development of the headaches. A 
review of the Social Security Disability Determination 
reveals extensive psychiatric problems wholly unrelated to 
headaches that result in his being totally disabled. (R310) 
The headaches are not considered a part of this. 
Again, under the Allen (supra) decision, the burden 
is on the Respondent to show medical causation. The 
opinion, placing and describing the burden, states: 
"Under the medical cause test, the claimant must 
show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the 
stres, strain, or exertion required by his or her 
occupation led to the resulting injury or disabil-
ity. In the event the claimant cannot show a 
medical causal connection, compensation should be 
denied." 
It is respectfully submitted that the Respondent has 
failed to meet this burden and establish medical causation 
in addition to failing to meet the legal causation test. 
POINT III. THE INADEQUACY OF MR. MAYHEW'S BRIEF 
FAILURE TO SUPPLY TIMELY COPIES OF 
ALL PLEADINGS AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED 
TO BOTH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE IRREG-
ULAR AND IMPROPER DESIGNATION OF 
PARTIES. 
Respondents counsel after 40 years of practice is being 
confronted with an appeal by an Appellant acting as his own 
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counsel. In trial proceedings and in particular in adminis-
trative proceedings, this counsel has gone to great lengths 
to see the other side is represented. This was particularly 
true when I was an ALJ with the Industrial Commission. Had 
I been aware of this appeal being taken without counsel, I 
would have attempted to find someone to advise Mr. Mayhew. 
The purpose of the above statement to the Court of 
Appeals is to assure this court that Hercules, Inc. and 
myself as counsel do not want anyone to believe we take 
advantage of these situations. The reverse is true, we 
expect all our employees to have full benefit of whatever 
rights they may have. 
As spelled out in the section dealing with the "Course 
of Proceedings - Disposition Below", Respondent has careful-
ly enumerated the instances of failure to give this Respon-
dent notices of steps taken before the Commission, copies of 
purported new evidence and the course of the appeal. Respon-
dents counsel had in fact closed his file and billed 
Hercules for his services. 
When notified of the preparation of the transcript, 
Respondent was aware that an appeal had been perfected. The 
basis for the appeal was totally unknown. A transcript was 
ordered in partial preparation for defending the appeal. 
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The substance of the Appeal was not known until August 
7, 1989 when the Appellant served his copies of his brief 
consisting of 30 pages of the brief and 25 separate adden-
dums totaling close to 60 or so separate pages. 
Beginning with the "Statement of the Case" Respondent 
is unable to determine what Appellant believes the purpose 
of his being before this Court. This section is in sub-
stance a continuing argument with all his grievances with 
his employer. 
Just prior to the brief portion a reference is made to 
the Jurisdiction of High Court of Appeals and quotes Section 
7-2-2-(3)(a) which concerns the Supreme Court and not the 
Court of Appeals. 
With regard to the "Nature of Proceeding" this recites 
nothing more than Respondents dissatisfaction with the con-
duct of the hearing. Complaining about interruptions 
occasioned by objections from Respondent to questions as 
well as objections by his own counsel. Respondent alleges 
he was in pain and couldn't remember datesf events (etc.). 
Respondent had no difficulty in remembering with some detail 
purported acts of conspiracy (etc.). 
"Issues and Detail of the Case" a restatement of a 
denial of opportunity to be heard, incorrect statements 
regarding the content of the record. Reference is made to 
several memos involving transfers, attempted layoffs, all of 
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which concerned actions and proceedings prior to March, 
1987. 
"Medical Causation" consisted of 10 pages of complaints 
on the severity of his pain, the production of which related 
to his inability to function. In the course of this, Appel-
lant agrees that he has totally disabiling arthritis and 
such was found by SSI. 
In the discussions, Appellant refers to the Graybar 
Electric case of 1928 dealing with a hernia. Appellant 
refers to the Pintar case which deals with partial impair-
ments . 
In the section entitled "Disposition at Trial Court" 
Appellant correctly states what took palce at the administra-
tive level and how the case eventually ended in the Court of 
Appeals. 
The next section is totally baffling by name. It is 
entitled "Legal Caucasion." I am unfamiliar with Appellants 
intention in this section since he refers initially to Sec-
tion 35-1-45 of the Workers Compensation Act describing acci-
dent. However, the next referenced section of the code is 
Section 34-35-6 which deals with the Anti-Discrimination 
Division of the Industrial Commission. The division has 
nothing to do with industrial accidents. 
"Summary of the Argument" amounts to a restatement of 
arguments earlier made as outlined above. 
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"Conclusions and Relief Sought" deals with the subject 
of Appellants disadvantage of not having counsel and the 
refusal of the Court of Appeals to appoint counsel. 
Appellant argues that his case was improperly presented by 
his counsel. As a matter of fact, the reverse is true. Mr. 
Lemmon wrung out of this hearing all possible evidence favor-
able to Appellant. Appellant was desirous of attempting to 
get into the record matters wholly irrelevant and immaterial 
and would be of no help in his receiving a favorable deci-
sion. Appellant finally recites benefits he believes he is 
entitled to under Section 34-35-6 dealing with unfair employ-
ment practices. Such matters are totally out of the sphere 
of workers compensation. 
I reviewed in detail the submitted addendum numbered 
1-25. All of the addenda are already in the record on 
appeal dealing with any aspect of the comepnsation claim. 
Several deal with the EEOC and the Anti-Discrimination Divi-
sion. Some of these are in the file but none have ny 
application or relevancy to workers compensation. 
Respondent has heretofore referred in this brief the 
shortcomings both as to notices and copies of the proceed-
ings. Such failures increased the difficulties in even 
writing this brief. 
The only insight I can gain from a total review of 
Appellant's brief is that he was dissatisfied with the 
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treatment he received by Hercules. Respondent insists that 
Hercules has been a good and understanding employer to this 
man. Hercules has continued to receive claims of mistreat-
ment , harrassment, bad faith (etc.) by the Respondent but 
has never responded in kind. Respondent has never termin-
ated Appellant. Appellant is drawing long term disability 
from the insurance carrier for Hercules. Upon passing a 
physical examination Appellant could be rehired although 
Social Security Disability indicating total disability would 
prevent his return. 
CONCLUSION 
In order for an industrial injury to be compensable, it 
must meet the dual causation test set forth in Alien, 
supra. A decision of the Commission in denying the exis-
tence of either medical causation or legal causation justi-
fies the Court of Appeals in affirming the Industrial 
Commission's decision denying Appellant workers compensation 
benefits as a result of the incident of March 12, 1987. 
DATED this day of September, 1989. 
/ ^ .// 
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY 
Attorney for Respondent 
Hercules, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM N O . 1 
35-1-45. Compensation for industr ial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the depen-
dents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospi-
tal services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
ance carrier and not on the employee. 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case Mo: B88000609 
* 
NORMAN J. MAYHEW, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* 
v s . * FINDINGS OF FACT 
HERCULES, INC. and/or * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIGNA, * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room #332, Utah Industrial Commission, 160 East 300 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 14, 1988 at 8:30 
o'clock a.m. Said hearing was pursuant to order and notice 
of the Industrial Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant was present and represented by M. Gale 
Lemmon, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants were represented by Robert J. Shaughnessy, 
Attorney at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the defendants, by and 
through counsel, made a Motion to Dismiss the Application for Hearing on the 
grounds that the applicant had failed to sustain his burden of proof proving 
that he sustained a compensable industrial accident on or about March 12, 
1987. Being fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is 
prepared to enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein, Norman J. Mayhew was a quality control engineer 
employed by Hercules at their Clearfield plant. The applicant testified that 
his job was to implement inspection points within the assembly procedure at 
Hercules. The applicant started working at Hercules in February 1966, and was 
layed off in 1976 which lasted until 1981. The applicant then returned to 
work at Hercules and before being transferred to Clearfield in 1985 the 
applicant was a Records Retention Clerk at the Bacchus Works. 
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The applicant testified that once he transferred to the Clearfield 
plant, he started experiencing stress headaches and related that one of the 
past superintendents was very abusive. The applicant testified that they were 
constantly getting orders to change the paper work on the floor, and that it 
was "all a conspiracy" because he suggested a change, which was rejected. The 
applicant testified that he was feeling threatened, and was starting to get 
irritable, and was starting to have headaches. The applicant testified that 
things were going on behind his back, and that he was unable to secure any 
overtime work, although two other similarly situated employees were given 
overtime. The applicant testified that he had a company physical in January 
of 1986 and at that time was complaining of serious headaches. The 
applicant's testimony was replete with examples of perceived employer 
harassment of him. The applicant testified that he is a crusader for what is 
right, and that the muscles in the back of his neck will tighten up from 
stress. The applicant denied any prior neck or head pain before March of 
1987, and denied any prior headaches. 
The basis of the applicants workers compensation claim, concerns a 
staff meeting which occurred on March 12, 1987. By way of background, the 
applicant was given a copy of his personnel appraisal review form in early 
March of 1987 by his supervisor. In that evaluation, the applicant was 
informed that he would need improvement in the area of communicating the 
technical information required as part of his job, and that his overall rating 
was competent. The applicant took issue with his evaluation, and took it upon 
himself to publish a Memo for distribution to some of the Hercules* employees 
asking them to list his good points and bad points. The applicant was 
"written-up" for this violation of company rules, and was found to be guilty 
of misappropriation of company resources for a personal project, and 
disruptive behavior within the workplace. Because of the applicant's 
dissatisfaction with his job evaluation, a meeting was arranged between the 
applicant's immediate supervisor, the applicant, the Personnel Manager, and 
the Quality Control Manager. That meeting was scheduled for March 12, 1987. 
At the meeting, the applicant's communication deficits were 
discussed, as was his overall rating. It should be noted that the applicant's 
job was not in jeopardy as the result of the performance evaluation. Rather, 
the meeting was called in an effort to satisfy the applicant. It should 
further be noted that the evaluation the applicant received in March of 1987 
was actually better than any of his prior evaluations since he had transferred 
to the Clearfield plant. Once at the meeting, the parties discussed the 
applicant's review, and according to two of the participants at the meeting, 
who testified, the applicant was gaining ground with respect to getting his 
point across, when all of a sudden the applicant threw up his arms and 
muttered something to the effect "what's the use" and then stormed out of the 
meeting without any further communication. 
The following morning the applicant called into work and informed his 
immediate supervisor that he had a stress headache and would be reporting to 
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the company clinic. The applicant reported to the company clinic, and 
complained of a headache, for which he received an ice pack for his forehead. 
The applicant was then seen later that day at the Ogden Clinic. On March 19th 
the applicant called in to his supervisor and complained of neck pain but no 
headaches. Eventually the meeting was reconvened on March 23, 1987, and at 
that time the applicant presented his own list of what he felt were 
requirements for an outstanding evaluation. The applicant's immediate 
supervisors rejected his proposals, and again tried to resolve the differences 
concerning the applicant's evaluation report. The applicant was requested to 
sign the evaluation as well as the incident report, to which he responded he 
would have to make an off plant phone call before he could sign those 
documents. The applicant left the meeting, which was a calm meeting, and 
there was no other communication with the applicant concerning his evaluation 
report or the incident report. At both meetings, the applicant did not appear 
to be in pain, according to two of the participants at that meeting, and with 
respect to the first meeting, that meeting has been described as being less 
strident than other personnel evaluation reviews. 
The applicant has been unable to work since March 13, 1987 and on 
July 26, 1988 was found to be permanently disabled by the Social Security 
Administration, as the result of severe degenerative disc disease of the 
cervical spine and a depression disorder. 
Since the applicant is contending that he has sustained a compensable 
industrial accident on or about March 12, 1987, it is necessary to apply the 
test of an industrial accident set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Allen v Industrial Commission 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Allen requires that 
proof that the injury occurred "by accident" and that there is a causal 
connection between the alleged accident and the activities or exertions 
required in the workplace. The first test which must be satisfied is the 
legal causation test. That test for those with pre-existing conditions 
requires that the employment must contribute something substantial to increase 
the risk the applicant already encountered in everyday life because of his 
condition. In this case, the evidence is rife with instances of prior 
headache complaints of the applicant. The applicant attempted to minimize his 
prior headache complaints on both direct and cross examination. The applicant 
also initially denied any head trauma or injuries or neck injuries 
whatsoever. Upon further probing, it was revealed that the applicant had 
sustained an accident on or about September 9, 1985 while playing football 
with his children. According to the office notes of Dr. Feyereisn dated 
September 11, 1985 the applicant fell down and hit his head on the ground and 
started complaining of neck and headaches thereafter. The applicant was given 
600 milligram Ibuprofen, and was diagnosed as having a whiplash type cervical 
strain. I should note that the applicant initially received medical treatment 
from the company clinic on September 10, 1985 when he was given Tylenol for a 
headache. The company's medical records indicate that the applicant came in 
complaining of a headache on July 16, 1985 and was given Tylenol at that 
time. The applicant was then seen by Dr. Feyereisn at the Ogden Clinic on 
September 11, 1985. 
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The applicant returned to the company clinic on September 16, 1985 
and the personnel there noted that the applicant was suffering from a 
non-industrial post-head injury, and that he was complaining of severe 
headaches and neck pains. The applicant was given more analgesic by the 
company clinic. That same day the applicant returned to the Ogden Clinic and 
received Naprosyn from Dr. Feyereisn, and was complaining of light headedness 
and some blurring of his vision. The applicant continued working, but 
continued to have problems with headaches. He reported to the company on 
January 16, 1986 of illness, but declined medication and requested that he be 
allowed to have a physical. However, that same day the applicant reported to 
the Ogden Clinic complaining of recurrent headaches on the left top of his 
head. On January 21, 1986 the applicant received his annual examination from 
Dr. Isakson. Apparently, the applicant was placed on a diet by the Clinic. 
The applicant was given a refill for Tylenol on April 2, 1986 by the company 
clinic. 
The applicant's next medical treatment for headaches occurred on 
November 27, 1986 when he reported to the company clinic complaining of a 
severe headache. The applicant was treated with bed rest and a cold pack on 
his forehead for one half four. The applicant next had treatment on March 12, 
1987 when he was seen by Dr. Blanche complaining of a headache. On March 13, 
1987, the applicant was seen at the Clinic early that morning complaining of 
headache. The applicant requested permission to lie down and also requested 
an ice pack, which was the same treatment he received on November 17, 1986. 
Later that day as previously indicated the applicant reported to the Ogden 
Clinic. On April 3, 1987 the applicant was seen by Dr. Blanche for complaints 
of severe headaches. Dr. Blanche took a history that indicated that he 
••states about a year ago on his job he got under stress and upset and 
developed a severe occipital headache that took a month to six weeks to 
subside." The doctor goes on to indicate that the applicant got along fairly 
well until about March 13, 1988 when ••something happened to him and so far 
feels he hasn't been able to obtain relief with ice packs, pills, etc.." The 
applicant told Dr. Blanche that he had been harassed ever since moving to 
Hercules and that since he had become 50 years of age that the company wanted 
to get rid of him. The doctor noted that the applicant would not go into the 
particulars as to what the stress might have been. Dr. Blanche concluded that 
the applicant was suffering from anxiety and tension with depression, and that 
he should probably should be prescribed an antidepressant. 
From the foregoing, it should be clear to the reader that the 
applicant has had a history of complaints of severe headaches. The headache 
which the applicant had on March 13, 1987 is no different from the headache he 
had on November 17, 1986. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes 
that the higher legal causation standard of Allen applies in this case. 
Accordingly, the applicant must show something unusual or extraordinary about 
the work activities of March 12, 1987 which would justify the Administrative 
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Law Judge making a finding that a compensable event occurred on that date. 
From the applicant's testimony and from the testimony of the participants in 
that meeting, I have gleaned no evidence of any unusual activity or exertion 
which may have occurred in that meeting. The record is devoid of any evidence 
that that meeting of March 12, 1987 was the stressful event that the applicant 
would have the Administrative Law Judge believe. The applicant has contended 
that the meeting of March 12, 1987 was for the purpose of laying him off. 
Yet, nothing could be further from the truth. The evidence proffered at the 
time of the hearing from the testimonial witnesses was that the applicant 
would not have been fired as the result of his evaluation report, in fact the 
report that the applicant was so upset about was actually an improvement over 
his prior two personnel appraisal reports. Therefore, it strains credulity to 
assume that the applicant would have thought that his job was on the line 
because of an evaluation, when that evaluation was better than any prior 
evaluation he had received while working at Clearfield. Further, the meeting 
was basically called at the insistence of the applicant, owing to his refusal 
to sign the personnel evaluation report. It would appear to the 
Administrative Law Judge that the defendants, in a spirit of working together, 
attempted to resolve and address the applicant's concerns. 
After reviewing the findings of the Social Security Administration, 
and the other medical reports on file, it would appear to the Administrative 
Law Judge that much of the activity at Hercules, which the applicant was 
concerned about, was of no significance. In light of the applicant's medical 
problems, it can be explained as the product of a paranoid personality, which 
Dr. Abdullah has found that the applicant suffers from. Once that diagnosis 
is brought to the fore, the conspiracy theories and other theories propounded 
by the applicant make some semblance of sense. However, the medical evidence 
does not show any causal connection between the applicant's meeting of March 
12, 1987 and the severe headache he started complaining of. Rather, the file 
clearly indicates that the applicant was complaining of severe headaches prior 
to March 12 or March 13, 1987 and accordingly any headaches that he complained 
of on March 12 or March 13, 1987 were not fundamentally different than the 
prior complaints he had already had. In fact, the reader may recall that the 
treatment the applicant received at the company clinic on March 13, 1987 was 
exactly the same as the treatment he received on November 17, 1986. When the 
applicant reported to the Clinic on March 13, 1987 he knew what treatment to 
request, and he requested that treatment, namely permission to lie down for 30 
minutes and an ice pack for his forehead. 
Therefore, rather than to prolong this opinion with further 
variances, suffice it to say the applicant has not met either his legal 
causation burden or his medical causation burden in this case. Put 
differently, in good conscience, I can find no evidence of any unusual 
activity or exertion which occurred on March 12 or March 13, 1987 while the 
applicant was employed by Hercules, Inc.. Rather, I find that the applicant 
had a long standing history of complaints of severe headaches, and that the 
headache of March 13, 1987 was no different than prior headaches the applicant 
had already been complaining of. 
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COMCLUSIOMS OF LAW: 
The applicant has not sustained his burden of proving by 
preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a compensable industrial 
accident on March 13, 1987, which accident arose out of or during the course 
or scope of his employment with Hercules, Inc.. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Morman J. Mayhew alleging a 
compensable industrial accident on or about March 12, 1987 while employed by 
Hercules, Inc. should be, and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Timothy C ./Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
31** day of October, 1988. 
ATTEST: 
Linda J.^Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
AjLdJdbLf frit ?£~ 
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ADDENDUM NO. 3 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 88000609 
NORMAN J. MAYHEW, * 
Applicant, * ORDER DENYING 
VS. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
HERCULES, INC., and/or * 
CIGNA, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On October 21
 f 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying the 
applicant in the above-captioned case workers compensation benefits associated 
with the applicant's severe headaches, which the applicant claimed resulted 
due to stress in the work place. In the Administrative Law Judge's Order, the 
Administrative Law Judge noted that the applicant's medical history showed the 
applicant first complaining of headaches in July of 1985. Per the records, 
the headaches increased in severity after the applicant sustained a head 
injury on September 9, 1985, at home playing football with his children. The 
Administrative Law Judge also noted that the applicant reported to the 
defendant/employer's medical clinic several times in 1986, due to severe 
headaches. Then, in early 1987, the applicant experienced some conflict with 
his superiors at work, which conflict involved his performance reviews. 
Shortly thereafter, the applicant discontinued working due to severe headaches 
on March 13, 1987. 
In analyzing the applicant's headache condition to determine whether 
it could be considered a compensable industrial injury, the Administrative Law 
Judge stated that the applicant needed to show both medical and legal 
causation. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the applicant could 
not meet the legal causation test because that test required that the 
applicant be injured pursuant to exertion greater than that experienced by 
Twentieth Century individuals in normal non-employment life. The 
Administrative Law Judge explained that this requirement of unusual exertion 
is applicable to the applicant's headache condition because the applicant had 
a pre-existing headache problem prior to the date the stress in the workplace 
was apparent. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that this kind of 
unusual exertion did not occur in the applicant's workplace. Also, the 
Administrative Law Judge determined that the applicant could not establish 
medical causation because the headaches appeared to be either the result of 
the 1985 at-home head injury or the result of functional overlay (per the 
medical records). For lack of both legal and medical causation, the 
Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant's headache condition was 
noneompensable. 
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On November 21
 f 1988, pursuant to U. C. A. 35-1-82.53, the applicant 
filed a pro se Motion for Review. The Motion for* Review is quite lengthy and 
is comprised almost entirely of a word-for-word duplication of the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Findings of Fact. A number of exhibits are attached to the 
Motion for Review which for the most part document the applicant's job 
requirements, personnel actions, employer policies and Social Security 
disability award. In what the applicant referred to as the "Addendum," he 
points out that he feels that the Administrative Law Judge used too stringent 
of a standard in determining the compensability of his claim. This is the 
only reason given by the applicant that the Commission can find which 
specifies why the applicant objects to the Administrative Law Judge's Order. 
The Commission finds that the only issue on review is whether the 
Administrative Law Judge correctly denied benefits in this case. The 
Commission adopts the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact as stated in 
the October 21, 1988 Order. The Commission agrees with the Administrative Law 
Judge that medical and legal causation have not been established. With 
respect to medical cause, the medical records submitted, in general, do not 
specify a medical opinion regarding what was causing the headaches. Most of 
the reports or records just state what the applicant felt was causing the 
headaches. At least one doctor did specify some concerns with respect to 
functional overlay. Therefore, a causal connection between the work problems 
is not clearly established by the medical records. With respect to legal 
causation, the Commission agrees with the Administrative Law Judge that the 
higher unusual exertion requirement is applicable due to the applicant's 
history of headaches prior to the 1987 work conflict. Although it is 
difficult to discern what mental stresses the 20th Century individual must 
face in everyday non-employment life, the Commission finds that the stress 
caused by disagreement with a superior's performance review cannot be 
considered unusual in intensity when compared with everyday family, financial 
or other non-employment stresses. Because the Commission finds that neither 
legal nor medical cause are established, the Commission must affirm the 
Administrative Law Judge and deny the Motion for Review. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's November 21, 1988 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's October 21, 1988 Order 
is hereby affirmed with appeal to the Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days 
as specified in U. C. A. 63-46b-12 through U. C. A. 63-46b-14 and U. C. A. 
35-1-86. 
NORMAN J. MAYHEW 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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fliomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
7& day of March, 1989. 
ATTES 
7^ 'Linda J. S t ^ s o u r g Commissiory/Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March / , 1989, a copy of the attached 
Order Denying Motion for Review, in the case of Norman M. Mayhew, was mailed 
to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Norman J. Mayhew, 1806 Pleasant View Drive, Ogden, UT 84414 
M. Gale Lemmon, Atty., 311 South State Street, Suite 240, SLC, 
UT 84111 
CIGNA, Attn: Colleen Richardson, 2180 South 1300 East, Suite 
417, SLC, UT 84106 
/Robert Shaughnessy, Atty., 1800 S. W. Temple, Suite 407, SLC, UT 
84115 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
o6u~^ **^ZX 
Wilma Burrows 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that four true and correct 
copies of the foregoina Brief of Respondent was mailed 
postage pre-paid, this 7^ day of September, 1989. 
Mr. Norman J. Mayhew 
1806 West Pleasant View Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84414 
